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LABOR UNION FREE SPEECH AND UNLAWFUL ECONOMIC
COERCION UNDER SECTION 8(b)(1)(A) OF TAFT-HARTLEY*
CAMPAIGNS to organize employees may precipitate a conflict between the
labor organization's right to free speech and the worker's right to reject union
affiliation.1 On the one hand, the first amendment generally forbids govern-
mental interference with peaceful persuasion, and section 8(c) of the Taft-
Hartley Act provides that nonthreatening speech may not constitute evidence
of an unfair labor practice.2 On the other, section 8(b) (1) (A) of Taft-Hart-
*Local 639, Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters (Curtis Bros., Inc.), 119 N.L.R.B. No. 33
(Oct. 30, 1957), appeal docketed, No. 14347, D.C. Cir., Feb. 19, 1958; Lodge 942, Int'l
Ass'n of Machinists (Alloy Mfg. Co.), 119 N.L.R.B. No. 38 (Nov. 4, 1957), appeal pend-
ing, No. 15814, 9th Cir. These cases are cited throughout this Note as Curtis Bros., Inc.
and Alloy Mfg. Co. respectively.
1. The right to reject union affiliation is found in the National Labor Relations Act.
Section 7 of the original Wagner Act provided that "employees shall have the right to
self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities, for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." Act of July 5,
1935, c. 372, § 7, 49 STAT. 452. The Taft-Hartley Act amended § 7 of the Wagner Act by
adding that employees "shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities
except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring member-
ship in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 8(a)
(3) [union shop provision]." 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1952).
The right to refrain from union organization existed prior to the Taft-Hartley amend-
ment of § 7. See Tri-Plex Shoe Co. v. Cantor, 25 F. Supp. 996, 997 (E.D. Pa. 1939)
(preliminary injunction to restrain stranger picketing) ; see also NLRB v. Sterling Elec.
Motors, Inc., 109 F.2d 194, 204 (9th Cir. 1940) (dictum). The amendment was needed,
however, to make union interference with the right not to organize an unfair labor prac-
tice. See note 3 infra.
2. "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press . . . ." U.S. CoNsT. amend. I. For a discussion of Supreme Court cases construing
this amendment in the context of a union organization campaign, see Cox, The Influence
of Mr. Jstice Murphy on Labor Law, 48 MIcE. L. REV. 767, 787-93 (1950); see also
-note 29 infra.
Section 8(c) of Taft-Hartley provides that "the expressing of any views, argument, or
opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form,
shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions
of this Act, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit."
61 STAT. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1952).
The legislative history of the act indicates that § 8(c) was primarily intended to coun-
teract the National Labor Relations Board procedure of finding an employer unfair practice
by coupling a verbal employer expression of antiunionism with some overt employer action
insufficient in itself to establish a Wagner Act violation. See S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess. 23-24 (1947) ; H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1947) (Conference
Committee Report). Nonetheless, § 8(c) by its terms extends its protection to unions.
See H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, 33 (1947). Senator Taft, floor manager
of the Taft-Hartley bill in the Senate, visualized the section as alleviating unduly restric-
tive board and court applications of § 8(b) (1) (A). 93 CONG. REG. 4020 (1947). For the
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ley proscribes union efforts which "coerce employees" into accepting union
membership or representation.3 So long as organizational campaigns are con-
fined to the employees immediately concerned, the National Labor Relations
Board reconciles section 8(b) (1) (A) with union free speech by prohibiting
only physical intimidation or threats of job discrimination.4 Application of
8(b) (1) (A) becomes difficult, however, when union campaigns comprise
appeals to customers or suppliers inducing them to cease doing business with
text of § 8(b) (1) (A), see note 3 infra. For interpretations of § 8(c) with respect to
§ 8(b) (1) (A), see Admin. Decision of NLRB Gen. Counsel, No. 971, CCH LAB. L. RzP.
1954-55 Transfer Binder ff 52080 (1954) (union may falsely tell employees that employer
is planning to shut down); Admin. Decision of NLRB Gen. Counsel, No. K-169, CCH
LAB. L. REP. 1955-56 Transfer Binder ff 53517 (1956) (inducement to join union by dis-
tributing free beer, reducing initiation fees and making false statements about wages paid
in union shops elsewhere is not unlawful). Name-calling and profanity are also protected
by § 8(c). International Longshoremen's Union, 79 N.L.R.B. 1487, 1493-94, 1505 (1948) ;
Perry Norvell Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 225, 235, 242 (1948). Publication and distribution of a
circular accusing an employer of intimidating employees and of causing religious antagonism
in order to discourage unionization is protected by § 8(c) even if the statements are un-
true. Admin. Decision of NLRB Gen. Counsel, No. 284 (1952), abstracted in 2 CCH LAB.
L. REp. ff 3850.33 (1958).
For a general discussion of the problems raised by § 8(c), see Cox, Some Aspects of
the Labor Managent Relations Act, 1947, 61 HARV. L. REv. 1, 15-20 (1947).
3. Section 8(b) (1) (A) reads: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor or-
ganization or its agents . . . to restrain or coerce . .. employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 7; Provided, That this paragraph shall not impair the right
of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or reten-
tion of membership therein . . . ." 61 STAT. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (A)
(1952). Section 7 is quoted at note 1 supra.
If the NLRB establishes that an unfair labor practice has occurred, it may issue a
cease and desist order and petition a court of appeals to enforce the order. 61 STAT. 147-48
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1952). After receiving but prior to hearing a complaint, the
Board may petition a federal district court for injunctive relief on behalf of an injured
party. 61 STAT. 149 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1952).
4. For cases refusing to construe § 8(b) (1) (A) to proscribe peaceful picketing, see
note 7 infra. For cases finding 8(b) (1) (A) violations, see Rupp Equipment Co., 112
N.L.R.B. 1315 (1955) (union-induced employer retaliation) ; Bell Aircraft Corp., 105
N.L.R.B. 755, 756 (1953) (similar); Peerless Tool and Engineering Co., 1.11 N.L.R.B.
853, 857-58 (1955) (threat not to process grievance) ; District 50, United Mine Workers,
106 N.L.R.B. 903 (1953) (assaults and firing shots) ; Pinkerton's Nat'l Detective Agency,
Inc., 90 N.L.R.B. 205, 211-12 (1950) (threat of inducing employer to discharge worker) ;
Randolph Corp., 89 N.L.R.B. 1490, 1491 (1950) ("If you go to work in the morning ...
there will be trouble . . .") ; Local 1150, United Elec. Workers, 84 N.L.R.B. 972, 974
(1949) (mass picketing, blocking ingress of nonstriking workers); United Furniture
Workers, 81 N.L.R.B. 886 (1949) (assaults upon nonstriking employees) ; Note, 42 MINN.
L. Ray. 459, 465 & nn.27-30 (1958) (collecting other cases).
The legislative history of Taft-Hartley indicates that § 8(b) (1) (A) proscribes vio-
lence. "[T]hreats of reprisal against employees, .. .direct interference by mass picketing
and other violence" are activities encompassed by § 8(b) (1) (A). S. RE_. No. 105, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1947) (supplemental views of Senators Taft, Ball, Donnell and Jen-
ner).
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an employer until his workers are organized. Although section 8(c) and the
first amendment would appear on their face to protect the peaceful solicitation
of third parties, a resulting boycott may so harm the employer that his em-
ployees are compelled to join the union in order to preserve their jobs.6
5. Inducement of this sort could take the form of a picket line at customer entrances,
the distribution of "unfair lists" to the general public or union members, newspaper adver-
tisements announcing that the employer is unorganized and should not be patronized, and
oral appeals to suppliers not to sell to him. If the employer does not operate a retail estab-
lishment, a boycott might be organized by soliciting his customers directly. For cases in-
volving such fact situations, see Curtis Bros., Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. No. 33 (1957) ; Alloy
Mfg. Co., 119 N.L.R.B. No. 38 (1957) ; Local 74, United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 80
N.L.R.B. 533 (1948) ; see also cases collected note 7 infra; Note, 44 VA. L. Rav. 741, 742
n.4 (1958).
The NLRB and courts have generally failed to analyze the three-party situation as an
area of § 8(b) (1) (A)-§ 8(c) conflict. See note 7 infra; cf. Vladeck, Organization and
Recognitionr Picketing, N.Y.U. 8THr ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 207, 212-14 (1955).
But see Trial Examiner, Intermediate Report, Alloy Mfg. Co., 119 N.L.R.B. No. 38 (1957)
(persuasive oral appeals entitled to § 8(c) protection).
An analytically identical problem occasionally arose under § 8(1) of the Wagner Act,
which made it illegal for an employer to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in
the exercise of their right to organize. Act of July 5, 1935, c. 372, § 8(1), 49 STAT. 452.
For example, an employer would request local merchants to deny union members credit.
See NLRB v. Salant & Salant, Inc., 183 F.2d 462 (6th Cir. 1950). In restraining this
conduct, the courts found the party solicited to be acting in the interest of the employer,
and thus attributed the antiunion discrimination to the employer. Where the addressee was
an independent businessman supporting an antiunion campaign out of personal conviction
and without having been solicited, resort to this agency fiction was an unsatisfactory
method of enforcing employer neutrality. See Brown Shoe Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 803, 827-29
(1936). No cases of this type have arisen since the Taft-Hartley Act changed the defini-
tion of "employer" from "any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or
indirectly . . ." to "a person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly . . .
61 STAT. 137 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1952), amending 49 STAT. 450 (1935).
A similar analytical problem arises under § 8(b) (4) (A) of Taft-Hartley, which pro-
scribes inducing employees to refuse to handle goods if the purpose is a specified illegal
objective. 61 STAT. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (A) (1952). Appeal to an employer
in order to accomplish the same objective is not proscribed. See Note, 67 YALE L.J. 893,
900 & n.25 (1958).
6. Congress does not seem to have considered the three-party situation which gives
rise to this conflict between § 8(b) (1) (A) and § 8(c). Section 8(b) (1) (A) by its terms
refers only to two parties: the labor union (or its agents) and the employees. And § 8(c)
exempts from its protection only those expressions which connote "threat of reprisal or
force or promise of benefit." The sections conflict whenever nonthreatening speech directed
to third parties results in indirect coercion of employees.
The Taft-Hartley committee reports fail to specify what is meant by "restraint or
coercion." The House committee report states that union representatives may use "reason-
able means to persuade employees to join the unions," but may not "harass or abuse" them.
H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1947). The Senate committee report refers
specifically to mass picketing and violence, but also says that the employee should be pro-
tected from union as well as employer "duress." S. REP. No. 105, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 50
(1947) (supplemental views of Senators Taft, Ball, Donnell and Jenner).
The floor debate is equally inconclusive. In order to allay the fears of senators who
argued that § 8(b) (1) (A) might be used to restrain peaceful union organizational activ-
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Rejecting its prior decisions that section 8(b) (1) (A) does not inhibit
appeals to third parties, the NLRB has determined in two leading cases that
union-induced economic pressure upon an employer may constitute unlawful
coercion of his employees.? In Curtis Bros., Inc., the Board found that picket-
ing a work site after union defeat in an election diminished the worker's finan-
cial security and therefore sought illegally to force them to accept the union
that they had rejected.8 The evidence did not demonstrate actual coercion or
ities, the phrase "to interfere with" was dropped. 93 CONG. REc. 4020-25, 4270-71 (1947).
The debate in the Senate centered primarily about union "threats" of violence, "false
promises" and "strong arm organizational techniques." 93 CONG. Rc. 4016, 4434 (1947).
On the other hand, Senator Taft, referring to an instance of organizational picketing
which did not involve physical threats, said that "the main threat was 'Unless you join
our union, we will close down this plant, and you will not have a job.' That was the threat,
and that is coercion." 93 CONG. REc. 4023 (1947). See, generally, Note, 42 MINN. L. REv.
459, 467, 473-74 (1958).
7. For prior cases refusing to extend § 8(b) (1) (A) to proscribe peaceful picketing,
see Painters' Dist. Council No. 6, 97 N.L.R.B. 654 (1951) (peaceful stranger picketing
for recognition not illegal) ; Medford Bldg. Trades Council, 96 N.L.R.B. 165 (1951)
(picketing to force employer to violate act by agreeing to discriminatory hiring provision
violates § 8(b) (2) but not § 8(b) (1) (A)) ; National Maritime Union, 78 N.L.R.B. 971
(1948) (similar) ; Miami Copper Co., 92 N.L.R.B. 322 (1950) (work stoppages to induce
employer to adjust grievances in absence of certified representative not unlawful even
though union attempting to obtain discrimination against nonunion employees); Perry
Norvell Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 225 (1948) (minority strike for recognition, when another union
had been recognized but not certified, does not violate § 8(b) (1) (A)) ; see also Admin.
Decision of NLRB Gen. Counsel, No. K-147, 37 L.R.R.M. 1241 (1956) (distribution of
leaflets at retail store asking public not to buy products of struck employer did not illegally
coerce nonstrikers); Admin. Decision of NLRB Gen. Counsel, No. 1069, 35 L.R.R.M.
1246 (1954) (if no union is certified as bargaining representative, § 8(b) (1.) (A) does not
outlaw strikes or peaceful picketing for organizational purposes or for recognition). In
recommending dismissal of the complaint in Curtis Bros., Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. No. 33
(1957), the Trial Examiner relied upon the earlier Board decisions. See cases prohibiting
violence and threats cited in note 4 supra.
In Capital Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 204 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1953), the court granted the
NLRB a temporary injunction restraining the employer from taking advantage of a state
court injunction against the union pending a determination of whether the union had en-
gaged in an illegal boycott under § 8(b) (4). The court, holding that Taft-Hartley pre-
empted state jurisdiction, indicated in a long discussion of § 8(b) (1) (A) that unfair lists
and union picketing of customer entrances constituted illegal coercion of employees. This
is the only pre-Curtis decision by either the NLRB or a federal court indicating that
solicitation of third parties might violate § 8(b) (1) (A). At the time, the Board refused
to follow Capita! Service and petitioned for rehearing, urging "that the court's holding is
erroneous and has important consequences in the administration of the Act." See Curtis
Bros., Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. No. 33, at 39 (Oct. 30, 1957) (dissenting opinion).
8. Curtis Bros., Inc., 1.19 N.L.R.B. No. 33 (Oct. 31, 1957), 42 MINN. L. REv. 459
(1958), 44 VA. L. Rv. 107, 741 (1958).
Respondent union had been certified as the exclusive bargaining agent of the Curtis
employees in 1953. After an impasse in bargaining early in 1954, the union began picket-
ing the company's premises and continued this activity until June 1956. Meanwhile, in
February 1955, the employer filed a representation petition questioning the union's con-
tinued majority status. The union filed a statement disclaiming any current intention to
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support an inference that the employees were coerced through economic loss to
the employer. 9 The Board held such proof unnecessary to establish an 8(b)
(1) (A) violation on the theory that the union was not attempting to organize
employees but to represent them by inducing the employer to recognize a
minority union.' 0 The NLRB extended this rationale in Alloy Manufacturing
Co., finding that post-election oral requests to customers and publication of the
company name on a union "We do not patronize" list are also forbidden by
section 8(b) (1) (A) and are not the "expression of views, arguments, or
opinions" protected by the first amendment or section 8(c). 11 The Board
represent the employees and changed its picket signs from "Curtis Brothers on Strike" to
"Curtis Bros. Employs Non-Union Drivers . . . Unfair to Teamsters Union No. 639
AFL." The Board, in September 1955, found the continued picketing inconsistent with
the attempted disclaimer and ordered an election on the ground that the union was at-
tempting to gain immediate recognition. The union lost the election by a 28 to 1 vote, but
the picketing continued. 119 N.L.R.B. No. 33, at 2-3.
9. "The Respondent Union also argues that there is 'absolutely no evidence' that its
picketing caused a loss of business to Curtis Brothers. It also asserts that the 28-1 vote
against the Union after 18 months of picketing negates any possible inference of coercion.
But success or failure of actions that tend to and are reasonably calculated to coerce is
not the criterion upon which a finding of coercion is based. The Respondent Union, by
advertising Curtis Brothers as 'unfair' at least, by its own admission, to customers, was
certainly attempting to hurt Curtis Brothers economically, and the fact that it may not
have succeeded (the record is silent as to the possible effects of the picketing on Curtis
Brothers' business) does not make the picketing any less coercive legally." Id. at 7.
10. The Board found that minority picketing has a restraining or coercive effect in
violation of § 8(b) (1) (A) because such picketing "trenches upon" the employees' privilege
to choose or reject any particular union. While conceding that picketing for purposes other
than recognition might be treated differently, the Board nonetheless said that a "literal"
reading of § 8(b) (1) (A) forbade all economic coercion and that, since the union's objec-
tive in this case was to force the employer to commit an unfair labor practice by recogniz-
ing a minority union, no attempt need be made to balance the "legitimate interests of
various parties, either directly involved in the proceeding or affected by it," or to recon-
cile this literal reading with other sections of the statute. (On the illegality of the picket-
ing, see 61 STAT. 140-41 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a) (3), (b)(2) (1.952).) Citing the
Supreme Court decisions allowing state limitation of picketing, the Board also rejected
the union's defense that picketing was constitutionally protected. The Board reasoned that
picketing causes a reduction in the employer's business, that such loss diminishes the em-
ployees' financial security and thus brings pressure on them to join the union, and that
this pressure is so coercive as to preclude the free choice guaranteed by § 7. 119 N.L.R.B.
No. 33, at 5-8.
• 1.1. "As the restraint and coercion brought to play upon the employees is an economic
one through curtailment or extinction of their employer's business, it is not really material
whether the pressure is applied through the act of picketing.., or by other equally direct
and effective techniques .... We see no basis for distinguishing appeals made orally to
consumers or away from an employer's premises from the self same appeals addressed to
consumers by way of a picket line." Alloy Mfg. Co., 119 N.L.R.B. No. 38, at 3 (Nov. 4,
1957).
The Trial Examiner's findings, adopted by the Board, id. at 1, showed that in June 1955
the respondent union had demanded recognition from Alloy at a time when it represented
no more than two of Alloy's twelve employees, and threatened to begin picketing if recog-
nition was not granted. Trial Examiner, Intermediate Report, p. 2, Alloy Mfg. Co., 119
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further stated that 8(b) (1) (A) prohibits similar pre-election pressure on an
employer designed to influence his employees.3
2
In Curtis and Alloy, the NLRB relied upon an artificial and much-criticized
distinction by purporting to proscribe recognitional activity, which induces an
employer to bargain with a minority union, but not organizational activity,
which seeks to persuade employees to affiliate.' 3 Actually, the union's ultimate
objective in both instances is to become the collective bargaining representa-
N.L.R.B. No. 38 (Nov. 4, 1957). When Alloy refused, respondent wrote to the union's
central labor council requesting that the company be placed on the "We do not patronize"
list, carried in the periodic publications of the council. In August 1955, a single picket was
stationed in front of Alloy's premises with a sign reading "This firm is non-union." Im-
mediately after a Board election in October 1955, in which the union received no votes,
the sign was altered to convey the message that Alloy's employees were "non-union" and
"unfair." Id. at 3. Throughout this period, the union business agent followed up the pub-
lished unfair lists with direct oral appeals to Alloy's customers to refrain from dealing
with Alloy. Ibid. The Trial Examiner, relying on earlier Board decisions, found that the
union attempted to cause the employer to discriminate illegally among employees when it
picketed the employer to force him to sign a union-shop contract. Id. at 4. Compare Denver
Bldg. Trades Council, 90 N.L.R.B. 1768, reV'd, 186 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341.
U.S. 675 (1951). The Trial Examiner also found that picketing for immediate recognition
coerced employees in violation of § 8(b) (1) (A) ; but he refused to find that the oral
appeals or placing the company on the "We do not patronize" list constituted evidence of
either unfair labor practice. The expression of any "views, argument or opinion" is pro-
tected by § 8(c), he reasoned, because the Supreme Court has drawn a distinction between
picketing and free speech. Trial Examiner, Intermediate Report, p. 5, Alloy Mfg. Co.,
119 N.L.R.B. No. 38 (Nov. 4, 1957).
Reversing the Trial Examiner in part, the Board followed its Curtis rationale and
found that "'coercion' exists in the fact that 'the Union seeks to cause economic loss to
the business during the period that the Employer refuses to comply with the Union's
demands. And the employees who chose to continue working, while the Union is applying
this economic hurt to the Employer, cannot escape their share of the damage caused to
the business on which their livelihood depends.'" 119 N.L.R.B. No. 38, at 3.
12. Member Jenkins concurred in Curtis and limited his decision to post-election
picketing because he felt that the complaint raised only that issue. He joined the majority
in Alloy in saying that "all picketing for an illegal objective regardless of whether there
has been an election" is unlawful. 119 N.L.R.B. No. 38, at 2 & n.2. (Member Murdock
dissented in both Curtis and Alloy.)
13. "Equally inapposite to the case at bar is minority picketing for organizational
purposes. In words, at least, such conduct falls within the statutory 'right to self-organi-
zation' set out in Section 7 of the Act. More important, organizational picketing is not
tainted, on its face, with the unlawful direct purpose of forcing the commission of an
unfair labor practice by the employer and the summary imposition of an unwanted union
upon its employees. At the same time, ...minority picketing, even for organizational
purposes, exerts a coercive force upon the employees who prefer to work. Such a case,
therefore, may well require a balancing of the right to organize against the right to be
free of restraint in the selection of a bargaining representative. That situation is not
presented in this case and we do not pass upon it, but, as cases of conflicting rights arise,
we shall undertake that 'difficult and delicate responsibility' which is our duty in the ad-
ministration of the statute entrusted to us." 119 N.L.R.B. No. 33, at 9-10.
For criticism of this distinction, see Cox, Some Current Problemns in Labor Law: An
Appraisal, 35 L.R.R.M. 48, 53-57 (1954) ; Comment, 20 U. CHrI. L. REv. 109 (1952). For
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tive.14 Hence, its solicitation of third parties may always be deemed evidence
of an illegal intent to seek recognition by coercing employees.' 5
More important, the Board gave little attention to whether the congressional
policy embodied in 8(b) (1) (A) is of sufficient importance to justify removing
first amendment and section 8(c) protection from peaceful picketing, oral
appeals and the distribution of unfair lists. 16 Previously, courts had held that
the policy of uncoerced worker self-determination only requires the restriction
of speech directly intimidating employees. 17 The unions' Curtis and Alloy cam-
paigns-consisting of nonthreatening appeals to third parties-would there-
fore appear immune from restraint, especially since section 8(c), in a possible
extension of the first amendment, protects the expression of any opinion con-
taining no "threat of reprisal ... or promise of benefit."1 8 In another context,
however, the Supreme Court has construed section 8(c) and the first amend-
ment to allow the proscription of union appeals which induce illegal boycotts
a collection of articles and cases, see Comment, 33 N.Y.U.L. REV. 410, 417 nn.56 & 57
(1958).
14. "The distinction between picketing for recognition and picketing for organization
is unrealistic. The resultant pressure on and harm to the employer and his employees is
precisely the same whether the picketing is said to be for one purpose or the other. If
the legality of stranger picketing be made to turn on the avowed purpose of the picketing,
the union need merely change the rhetoric of its placards to legalize its conduct. Nor
would a union find it difficult to justify its use of organizational rhetoric even though its
ultimate objective was recognition." Note, 20 U. CHI. L. REv. 109, 110-11 (1952).
The distinction is particularly unfortunate because it focuses judicial and NLRB at-
tention upon a verbal nicety and elusive "intent" rather than economic reality or useful
policy. The union has a legitimate interest in spreading organization in order to preserve
its labor standards. This interest is subject to reasonable restriction, but the organization-
recognition dichotomy has no relevance to the union's goal. See Cox, supra note 13, at
55-56. See also 119 N.L.R.B. No. 33, at 42 (1957) ("Picketing may result in persuading
employees to join a union as well as exerting pressure on an employer to recognize a union.
The effect ...on employees is the same regardless of whether the picketing is labeled
'organizational' or 'recognition'") (dissenting opinion).
15. See Comment, 33 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 410, 417 (1958).
Conversely, if the union were closed to new members and were picketing for recog-
nition, its activity would be partly organizational because of the employees' potentially
enhanced desire to seek membership should it become available. Cf. NLRB v. Gaynor
News Co., 197 F.2d 719, 722-23 (2d Cir. 1952) (to be illegal, "the union-encouraging
effect of discriminatory treatment [need not be] felt immediately"), aff'd sub nom. Radio
Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
16. See notes 10, 11 supra.
17. See notes 4, 7 supra. For the analogous rule, holding employer threats of economic
retaliation unprotected by § 8(c), see NLRB v. J. H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 229 F.2d 816
(5th Cir. 1956) (threat of discharge); Nylon Molded Products Corp., 116 N.L.R.B. 73
(1956) (same) ; see also NLRB v. Deena Art-ware, Inc., 198 F.2d 645, 650 (6th Cir. 1952)
(implied threat to close down plant carried by newspaper as part of interview with company
president) ; Vanadium Corp., 114 N.L.R.B. 428 (1955) (threat to enforce discipline more
strictly and remove such employee comforts as soft-drink machine) ; Geo. Byers Sons,
Inc., 111 N.L.R.B. 304 (1955) (threat to discontinue customary business).
18. 61 STAT. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1952), quoted note 2 supra.
[Vol. 671468
NOTES
by third-party employees.19 Consequently, section 8(b) (1) (A) may represent
a sufficiently important public interest-promotion of tranquil industrial rela-
tions through worker self-determination-to justify inhibiting similar appeals
to customers and suppliers.20 Nonetheless, a pre-eminent policy does not war-
rant the restraint of free speech unless actual or threatened contravention of
that policy is also established. 21 Incitement of an employee boycott, for ex-
ample, is not curtailed absent proof that a union induced a concerted work
19. In International Brotherhood of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694 (1951), the
Court specifically rejected the union's contention that § 8(c) immunized picketing inducing
work stoppages proscribed by § 8(b) (4) (A). That section forbids unions to "induce or
encourage" employees to stop work "where an object thereof is . . . requiring any em-
ployer . .. to cease doing business with any other person." 61 STAT. 141 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (A) (1952). Finding that the statutory terms "induce or encourage"
include every form of persuasion (hence, implicitly, purely free-speech activities), the
Court held that the general terms of § 8(c) must give way to the specific provisions of
§ 8(b) (4) (A). The Court said, moreover, that § 8(b) (4) (A) does not require an un-
constitutional abridgment of free speech because the "secondary boycott" is a "substantive
evil" the prevention of which justifies speeeh curtailment. 341 U.S. at 701-05. The Court
also approved the following decisions on § 8(b) (4) : NLRB v. Local 74, United Brother-
hood of Carpenters, 181 F.2d 126, 132 (6th Cir. 1950) (carpenters' strike to compel home-
owner to cancel contract with nonunion firm violative of § 8(b) (4) (A) and constitution-
ally unprotected) ; NLRB v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 184 F.2d 60, 62 (10th
Cir. 1950) (first amendment and § 8(c) do not immunize § 8(b) (4) boycott induced by
picketing, blacklist and intimidation of employee); NLRB v. Wine Workers, 178 F.2d
534, 587-88 (2d Cir. 1949) (similar); Printing Specialties Union v. Le Baron, 171 F.2d
331, 334-35 (9th Cir. 1948) (similar). 341 U.S. at 705. Cf. Giboney v. Empire Storage
& Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949) (state may restrain picketing incident to an attempt to
form a conspiracy in restraint of trade illegal under state law).
20. "The National Labor Relations Act is designed to promote industrial peace by
encouraging the making of voluntary agreements governing relations between unions and
employers.... The theory of the Act is that the making of voluntary labor agreements
is encouraged by protecting employees' rights to organize for collective bargaining and by
imposing on labor and management the mutual obligation to bargain collectively." NLRB
v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 401-02 (1952) ; see also Virginia Elec. & Power
Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533, 540-41 (1943).
The Supreme Court in International Brotherhood of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, supra
note 19, was forced either to nullify § 8(b) (4) (A) or to find, as it did, that national labor
policy justifies the abridgment of free speech authorized by § 8(b) (4) (A). This sharp
choice stemmed from the irreconcilable nature of § 8(c) and § 8(b) (4) (A) ; a violation
of the latter necessarily involves speech protected by the former. On the other hand, no
such conflict exists between § 8(c) and § 8(b) (1) (A), for unlawful coercion could be
construed to comprise only threats and violence. Nevertheless, if purely persuasive speech
can be curtailed under § 8(b) (4) (A), which protects employer markets, then a similar
curtailment should be found in § 8(b) (1) ('A), which protects employee self-determination.
21. The best-known standard for evaluating verbal threats to public order is the "clear
and present danger" test. "[It] is not a slogan or a shibboleth to be applied as though it
carried its own meaning; but ... it involves in every case a comparison between interests
vhich are to be appraised qualitatively .... In each case [the courts] must ask whether
the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free
1469
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
stoppage for a specific, forbidden purpose. 22 Similarly, the prohibition of union
appeals to customers and suppliers on grounds of coercing employees should
depend upon a definition and demonstration of probable coercion.23
The NLRB held that any "diminution of [an employee's] financial security"
is unlawful. 24 This criterion seems inadequate. As a factual matter, employees
speech as is necessary to avoid the danger." United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212
(2d Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (opinion of the court by L. Hand, J.).
Earlier, the Supreme Court had said that, "What finally emerges from the 'clear and
present danger' cases is a working principle that the substantive evil must be extremely
serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before utterance can be punished."
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941). But the Supreme Court, in Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951.), and American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339
U.S. 382 (1950), apparently vitiated the test for cases involving alleged Communists.
"[If] the public interest to be protected is substantial, it is obvious that a rigid test requir-
ing a showing of imminent danger to the security of the Nation is an absurdity." Id.
at 398. However, the Court may be returning to a "rigid test" for everyone. See Yates
v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 325 (1957) (Smith Act proscribes advocacy of forceful
overthrow of the Government only if the advocate urges someone "to do something . . .
rather than merely to believe in something"). See also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476, 484 (1957) (though upholding conviction for violation of obscenity statute, Court
stated that "all ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance . . . have the
full protection of the guaranties, unless excludable because they encroach upon the limited
area of more important interests").
22. See International Brotherhood of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694 (1951);
see also NLRB v. Denver Bldg. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951); NLRB v. Inter-
national Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665 (1951.).
23. Cf. NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469 (1941) (board finding
that employer disapproval of unionism was per se unlawful coercion reversed because no
evidence that speech was part of pattern of coercion) ; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88,
102 (1940) (state may not outlaw all peaceful picketing since "the dissemination of infor-
mation concerning facts of a labor dispute must be regarded as within the area of free
discussion that is guaranteed by the Constitution"). Although the Supreme Court has
retreated from its position that picketing is entitled to full free speech immunity, see note
29 infra, those aspects of picketing which are deemed free speech remain entitled to Thorn-
hill protection.
24. "And the employees who choose to continue working, while the union is applying
this economic hurt to the employer, cannot escape a share of the damage caused to the
business on which their livelihood depends. Damage to the employer during such picket-
ing is a like damage to his employees. That the pressure thus exerted upon the employees
-depriving them of the opportunity to work and be paid-is a form of coercion cannot be
gainsaid .... The diminution of their financial security is not the less damaging because
it is achieved indirectly by a preceding curtailment of the employer's interests." Curtis
Bros., Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. No. 33, at 6 (Oct. 30, 1957). "And, as in the case of picketing,
to the extent that the employer suffers the economic loss that the Union seeks to inflict,
the employees' earnings are threatened with diminution, and their very jobs endangered."
Alloy Mfg. Co., 119 N.L.R.B. No. 38, at 3 (Nov. 4, 1.957).
This language makes "coercive" any loss of overtime pay, decreased likelihood of a
wage raise, or reduced fringe benefit. The Board's standard is not only loose and vague,
it ignores such extrinsic factors as general under-employment, lack of comparable jobs in
the area, and employee need for overtime pay and fringe benefits. See 119 N.L.R.B. No.
33, at 31 (dissenting opinion) (Board's standard would forbid all picketing of unorganized
employees on their jobs).
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are probably not so easily persuaded to organize.2 5 As a constitutional matter,
the Board formulated the lowest possible standard for finding illegal coercion,
thus according the first amendment (and section 8(c)) virtually no weight.
Moreover, in applying this standard, the NLRB ignored free speech by failing
to require proof either that workers had actually been coerced or that the
employer had suffered business losses likely to reduce the financial security
of his employees.
26
The Board's standard could constitutionally rest on the principle that a com-
munication which induces responses stemming from an implicit threat, rather
than the ideas disseminated, is not entitled to full free speech protection.
2 7
Thus, in judging the solicitation of third parties, the NLRB might weigh the
relative amounts of intimidation and persuasiveness contained in the union
appeal.28 For example, picketing which connotes retaliation against persons
dealing with an employer of unorganized workers 29 would necessitate proof
25. As the union pointed out in Curtis, after the eighteen months of stranger picket-
ing the employees voted 28 to 1 against the union. See note 9 supra. If coercion means
"pressure sufficient to force an employee to vote for a union he really does not want,"
the union's campaign in this case was clearly noncoercive. Nor is there any evidence that
any employees were laid off as a result of the picketing.
26. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
Although the courts have not required proof of actual coercion in cases involving em-
ployer activities, they have demanded that activity which is to be proscribed tend to induce
the forbidden coercion. See, e.g., NLRB v. Illinois Tool Works, 153 F.2d 811 (7th Cir.
1946).
27. "Picketing by an organized group is more than free speech, since it involves
patrol of a particular locality and since the very presence of a picket line may induce
action of one kind or another, quite irrespective of the nature of the ideas which are being
disseminated. Hence those aspects of picketing make it the subject of restrictive regula-
tion." Bakery Drivers v. Wohl, 31S U.S. 769, 776-77 (1942) (concurring opinion), quoted
with approval in Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 464-65 (1950). See also Inter-
national Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957) (collecting similar
cases).
28. Cf. Note, 44 VA. L. REv. 741, 758 (1958).
29. Retreating from Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), the Supreme Court
has held that the presence of a person carrying a sign advertising a labor dispute removes
the communication from full free speech protection. Thus, states may restrict even peace-
ful picketing if its purpose violates state policy. See International Brotherhood of Team-
sters v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957). Mass picketing is, of course, coercive since
it forcefully prevents access to the picketed site. Other types of picketing may also imply
retaliation. See, e.g., Newell v. Chauffeurs Union, 181 Kan. 898, 317 P.2d 817, rev'd per
curiam, 356 U.S. 341 (1958) (union photographed customers entering struck dairy). (In
Curtis, the General Counsel alleged that the pickets took down the license plate numbers
of entering truckers; the Trial Examiner found the allegation unsubstantiated. 119 N.L.
R.B. No. 33, at 6 n.6). On the other hand, the picketing might be entirely noncoercive if,
for example, only one person, perhaps a woman, patrolled one retail entrance of a large
store. See International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470, 474 (1950)
("The effort in the cases has been to strike a balance between the constitutional protection
of the element of communication in picketing and 'the power of the State to set the limits
of permissible contest open to industrial combatants"') ; Hughes v. Superior Court, 339
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only that those workers were slightly coerced. 30 Unfair lists and analogous
written or verbal communication, on the other hand, might be found free of
threats and therefore permissible except when resultant severe economic pres-
sure on the unorganized employees is demonstrated. 31 Such a standard, how-
ever, would require NLRB determination of both the importance of the free
speech element in a wide complex of situations and the corresponding degree
of coercion rendering the speech unprotected.3 2 Isolating and assessing these
factors would doubtless produce intricate administrative distinctions seeking
to encompass an area notorious for its admixture of peaceful persuasion and
implied compulsion. 33 Furthermore, a test of this sort would focus the Board's
principal attention on the nature of the solicitation of third parties rather than
the putative illegal coercion of employees.
Consequently, the Board's test for unlawful coercion should be predicated
on the assumption that every nonviolent request to customers and suppliers
merits full free speech protection. In order to justify removing that protection,
the NLRB should determine whether the union's activity caused the employer
of the allegedly coerced workers to suffer economic loss of a magnitude requir-
ing the dismissal or layoff of a significant number of employees. 34 If imple-
U.S. 460, 465 (1.950) ("[B]ecause of its element of communication picketing under some
circumstances finds sanction in the Fourteenth Amendment').
See, generally, Cox, LABOR LAW 793 n.2, 799 n.11 (4th ed. 1958) (collecting articles);
Cox, Strikes, Picketing and the Constitution, 4 VAND. L. REv. 574 (1951); Vladeck, supra
note 5.
30. For example, if the picketing were primarily coercive with respect to the persons
solicited, the Board might constitutionally find an unfair labor practice if employee finan-
cial security was endangered (the Curtis test). Or the Board might infer coercion when
the employer's business fell off by some stated percentage or if the picketing continued
for more than a specified length of time.
31. Oral appeals to customers and suppliers would usually be noncoercive, although
in some situations the union's request might be backed up by threat of labor trouble if the
person solicited did not comply. Newspaper advertisements of a labor dispute would also
generally be persuasive only; but an ad in a union paper might be construed as a "signal"
and thus entitled to less constitutional protection. (No evidence was introduced in Alloy
to show that the oral appeals to customers were in any way threatening or intimidating.)
32. See Petro, Picketing and Labor Strategy, 2 LAB. L.J. 243 (1951) ; Petro, Effects
and Purposes of Picketing, 2 id. at 323. But see Cox, Strikes, Picketing and the Constitu-
tion, 4 VAND. L. REv. 574, 594-95 (1951) ; Cox, The Influence of Mr. Ju1stice Murphy on
Labor Law, 48 Micia. L. REv. 767, 788 (1950).
33. For discussions of the coercive and persuasive elements in picketing, see the ma-
jority and dissenting opinions in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Hanke, 339
U.S. 470 (1950) ; cf. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537-38 (1945).
34. The NLRB would probably have to establish a standard to guide it in determining
what percentage of the total work force constituted a "significant number." This figure
might vary depending upon general economic conditions, the availability of other work,
the industry involved and the area of the country. A different standard might be desirable
for areas where unions are relatively weak and are unlikely to succeed in organizing
workers unless a customer (or supplier) boycott, once achieved, is allowed to make itself
felt. See Note, 42 MINx. L. REV. 459, 484 (1958). To prevent the employer from manu-
facturing a union unfair labor practice by laying off more employees than the union-
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mented, this standard would proscribe only those union appeals having demon-
strable consequences which would probably prevent the average worker from
exercising a free choice with respect to unionism. In addition, the standard,
while manifesting the full reach of congressional intent to curb coercive unioni-
zation under 8(b) (1) (A), 35 would promote the countervailing policy of col-
lective bargaining by permitting economic hardship to flow from organizational
campaigns. 36 As a result, a labor organization-proceeding with its efforts but
not reaching the point where too many employee jobs were in actual jeopardy
-would have an effective opportunity to overcome the skepticism of unor-
ganized workers by displaying its capacity to injure their employer and hence
to represent them forcefully.
37
Additional restrictions on the solicitation of third parties may be warranted,
however, once workers have assessed the labor organization's strength and
declined affiliation in a valid election. Continued economic harm to the em-
ployer can then fulfill no useful function.38 In fact, it may frustrate the con-
gressional policy of worker self-determination by imposing unionism through
industrial unrest terminable only on employee capitulation.39 Consequently,
the Board should recognize the distinction, specifically rejected in Curtis and
Alloy, between pre- and post-election organizational activity, and prohibit all
appeals to third parties which cause an employer to lose business after ballot-
ing.40 Outright prohibition seems justified because, under these conditions, the
union's campaigns will serve primarily to coerce rather than to persuade em-
ployees.41 The moratorium on solicitation could last either for the one year
induced loss requires, the union should be allowed to contest the employer's good faith.
Given credible union evidence of employer bad faith, the employer could be required to
substantiate the business necessity for the layoff.
35. See note 6 supra.
36. See note 20 supra. The policy of promoting collective bargaining is found in § 1
of Taft-Hartley, 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1.952), and implies adequate union
means to establish collective bargaining units.
37. Picketing for organizational purposes "may be an important part of the elec-
tioneering not so much because of economic coercion but because the publicity and demon-
stration of the union's power go far to offset . . . employees' fear of running counter to
the employer's wishes .... " Cox, Some Current Problems in Labor Law: An Appraisal,
35 L.R.R.M. 48, 56 (1954). See also Note, 42 MINN. L. REv. 459, 484 (1958).
38. See Cox, supra note 37, at 56; cf. Note, 42 MINN. L. Rev. 459, 485 (1958).
39. If the NLRB-supervised election is to have significance as a device for determin-
ing the employees' choice, a distinction must be recognized between pre- and post-election
union activity. Unless employees who choose to reject the union can expect that the or-
ganizational pressures will cease for at least a reasonable period following the election,
their choice is hardly a free one. Implementing the concept of choice implicit in § 7 of
Taft-Hartley, the NLRB should bar the union from exerting economic organizational
pressures following an election. Cf. Cox, supra note 37, at 53-57; Comment, 20 U. CHI. L.
REv. 109, 115-16 (1952).
40. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
41. This prohibition would limit the union's attempts to organize only if employer
business losses were attributable to union activity. Unions could continue with impunity
to make direct appeals to employees in the form of speeches, handbills, or picketing con-
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during which no further election may be held, 42 or until circumstances change
sufficiently so that subsequent union efforts can perform the function of per-
suasion.
43
The suggested solution of the constitutional issues presented by section
8(b) (1) (A) should be accompanied by a legislative provision for holding
prompt elections after a reasonable period of organizational activity. Other-
wise, unions could engage with impunity in prolonged pre-election campaigns
which cause employers serious business losses but do not coerce his employees.
To prevent such injury from continuing indefinitely, Congress should permit
an employer to obtain relief through an election occurring as soon as the union
has had ample opportunity to convince workers to join.44 Election procedure
fined to employee entrances at times when workers (not customers) were entering or
leaving. On the problem of distinguishing picketing addressed to employees from picket-
ing addressed to customers, see NLRB v. Associated Musicians, 226 F.2d 900, 904 (2d
Cir. 1955).
For a proposal that unions which have lost elections be permitted to utilize "reasonable
alternatives" for further organization efforts, see Note, 42 MINN. L. REv. 459, 485 (1958).
42. "No election shall be directed in any bargaining unit . . . within which, in the
preceding twelve-month period, a valid election shall have been held .... " 61 STAT. 144
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (3) (1952).
43. Employees who have once been subjected to an effective union organizational
campaign will generally recall the previous pressure when the union attempts to renew
loss-inducing activities. Circumstances may change sufficiently, however, so that the union's
renewed campaign is persuasive rather than coercive. Factors to be considered in deter-
mining whether the activity is justified are the intensity of the original pressure, its re-
moteness in time, the amount of changeover in personnel, changes in union leadership if
these appeared to be a critical reason for rejecting the union previously, success of recent
organizational campaigns in similar industries or in the same community, and altered
economic conditions affecting the industry and the availability of other employment.
44. Section 8(b) (1.) (A), framed in terms of employees and unions, affords the em-
ployer no relief from union-induced loss during an organizational campaign. Although
§ 8(b) (4) protects the employer from certain organizational activities, it is not operative
unless the union induces employees rather than suppliers or customers. 61 STAT. 141
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (1952); NLRB v. Business Mach. Mechanics Conference
Bd., 228 F.2d 553, 559 (2d Cir. 1955); Local 47, Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 112
N.L.R.B. 923, 925 (1955).
If an organizational campaign proceeds for an extended period, although it causes in-
sufficient loss to coerce the employees (as in Curtis, where no employees were laid off in
eighteen months of picketing), the employer still should be able to demand an election. Cur-
rently, § 9(c) permits an employer to petition for an election only if one or more employees
have demanded that the union be recognized. 61 STAT. 144 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)
(1952). If the Board then determines that a question of representation exists, it will
arrange for an election. Ibid. But the union may disclaim any intention of becoming ex-
clusive bargaining agent, and the Board will generally find in such a case that no question
of representation exists. See, e.g., General Paint Corp., 95 N.L.R.B. 539 (1951). So long
as the union manifests "organizational" purposes as opposed to "recognitional," the Board
may decide that continued picketing and distribution of unfair lists is not inconsistent with
the union's disclaimer. See, e.g., Smith's Hardware Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 1009 (1951) ; Gen-
eral Paint Corp., supra. But cf. V & D Mach. Embroidery Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 1567
(1954) (disclaimer ineffective since union negotiated with employer and continued to
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of this sort would authorize the Regional Directors of the NLRB to hold in-
formal hearings on all contested issues and then to order immediate balloting
on union representation. 45 Subsequent to an election, a dissatisfied party could
appeal the Regional Director's determinations. 46
engage in picketing). Even if the employer is allowed to call for an election after the
union has had a reasonable opportunity to organize, a quick election would be desirable in
order to prevent injurious delays. Cf. Cox, supra note 37, at 53, 56 (union-induced loss
prior to an election is a social cost of an organizational campaign which an employer must
bear). See also Note, 42 MINN. L. REv. 459, 483 (1958) (suggesting the need for a
Taft-Hartley amendment authorizing the Board to consider the equities in each case before
deciding whether the employer should be able to carry on his business free from unneces-
sary interference).
Unions, also, could be authorized to demand quick elections in the event an 8(b) (1.)
(A) temporary injunction dissipated the momentum of an organization campaign. Such
an injunction is authorized by § 10(j) of Taft-Hartley, 61 STAT. 149 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(j) (1952), and may be sought in federal court by a Regional Director of the
NLRB, 29 C.F.R. § 101.32 (Supp. 1958).
45. NLRB Regulation § 101.17 authorizes the field examiners, subordinates of the
NLRB Regional Directors, to investigate representation petitions. 29 C.F.R. § 101.17
(1949). The examiners determine the existence of NLRB jurisdiction, the appropriate-
ness of bargaining units, the inclusion of specific employee groups within them, and
whether a given election reflected the employees' freedom of choice. Negative findings by
the field examiner on any one of these issues may precipitate time-consuming appeals to
the Board. Moreover, disagreement between union and employer over, for example, the
scope of the bargaining unit, or the appropriateness of the organizing union to represent
the employees, may also preclude a speedy consent election. If such differences arise, the
Regional Director must hold formal hearings and forward the record to Washington for
the NLRB to decide whether an election is warranted. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 101.19-20 (Supp.
1958).
The Board does not publish statistics indicating the average length of time required
for the handling of an unfair labor practice complaint or a contested petition for repre-
sentation. Some indication of the delays, however, is found in Curtis Bros., Inc., 119 N.L.
R.B. No. 33, at 2 (Oct. 30, 1957). The employer petition for decertification was filed
Feb. 1, 1955; Board determination that an election should be held was handed down
Sept. 20, 1955. In Alloy Mfg. Co., 119 N.L.R.B. No. 38 (Nov. 4, 1957), the hearing
before the Trial Examiner was on Nov. 19, 1956, and the Board decision finding an unfair
labor practice was announced on Nov. 4, 1957.
46. Providing for an appeal to the Board would ensure that uniform, NLRB-fashioned
criteria governed the outcome of disputed elections. Moreover, presently available rights
to appeal to the courts from the Board would be preserved. See 61 STAT. 147-48 (1947),
29 U.S.C. §§ 160(e), (f) (1952).
A difficult problem could arise on appeal to the Board if an unfair labor practice had
occurred between the time that the Regional Director ordered an election and the actual
balloting. If the union committed the unfair labor practice and the employees rejected the
union, then the election could be upheld, since the employees were not coerced by the unfair
labor practice. But if the union won the election, the Board must determine whether the
activity complained of unduly influenced the employees' choice. If so, a new election must
be held. E.g., New York Shipping Ass'n, 108 N.L.R.B. 135 (1954). On the other hand,
an employer unfair labor practice coupled with union defeat would always necessitate a
new election, provided the union had committed no unfair labor practice itself. E.g., Para-
mount Cap Mfg. Co., 1.16 N.L.R.B. 993 (1956).
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Statutory amendments along these lines would combine with the proposed
measure of unlawful coercion to achieve a three-way balance among effective
organizational campaigns, employee freedom from coercion, and employer pro-
tection against union-induced boycotts which cause substantial job losses among
his workers. Pre-election appeals to third parties would be sufficiently re-
stricted in duration and effect both to ensure worker self-determination under
8(b) (1) (A) and to limit injury to the employer's business. And post-election
union overtures to customers and suppliers would be proscribed if they con-
stituted an attempt to impose a clearly unwanted labor organization on a given
group of employees. Yet, within this framework, unions would enjoy meaning-
ful free-speech protection and could advocate collective bargaining by methods
capable of evoking favorable response from unorganized employees.
